

Heracleses

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Abstract

This work explores the philosophical problem of “everyness” — the concept of everything as itself, distinct from the many partial “alls” historically pursued by religion, philosophy, and science. The author critiques past thinkers from Thales to Derrida for reducing totality to singular perspectives, neglecting the essence of allness. Drawing on the allegory of the Hydra, an infinitely regenerating creature, the text presents a new symbolic framework for understanding the interplay between the All and the Part, consistency and inconsistency, truth and falsehood. Through the figure of Iolaus, who harmonizes destruction with respect for the Hydra’s nature, the author introduces the notion of Iolian Everyness, a reconciliatory vision that transcends ontological, epistemological, and theological boundaries. The study argues for a paradoxical, Ouroboric truth that embraces both affirmation and negation, proposing an artistic-philosophical methodology for grasping totality without reducing it to a fixed system. Ultimately, it calls for a “Hydraic Revolution” in thought — a reevaluation of all perspectives in light of their shared participation in everyness itself.

What is everything?

From the earliest days of civilization—through the birth of religion, philosophy, and science—human beings have sought to understand the world. But we have rarely, if ever, approached “everything” as itself. Instead, we’ve fragmented it, studied its parts, and constructed countless versions of “all”—all knowledge, all beings, all systems—without truly confronting allness itself. Scholars and thinkers have touched on this elusive notion from their own perspectives. Each has captured a facet of it, a reflection of the whole, but not the whole itself. What I seek to do here is not to redefine or classify everything, but to treat everything as itself—not as a sum of parts, not as a category of all things, but as a concept with its own independent presence. Naturally, one might ask: why does this matter? Why should we care about “everything” now? Before we answer that, let us pause. A careful observer may already see that importance itself is grounded in allness. When we call something important, it is often because it touches many aspects of our life—it resonates with, or represents, everything in some way. For example, we say love is important because it permeates nearly every corner of our lives—our emotions, our relationships, our identities. Knowledge, too, is central, for it structures our understanding of the world and reveals what is. Importance is justified, in other words, by its relation to everything. But in our time, a countercurrent has emerged. We live in an age that sometimes exalts the trivial. The postmodern condition, as Gilles Deleuze illustrates with his concept of the simulacrum, draws attention to surfaces, copies, and small details—even fakes—rather than eternal truths or grand wholes. And yet, even Deleuze positions these fragments within the frame of totality; they are small lights on the canvas of everything. Similarly, Jacques Derrida’s concept of hauntology—ghostly presences of the past lingering in the now—is a clever twist on

ontology, the study of being. But again, it's only meaningful because it invokes the backdrop of all being—all that exists and persists, including what is absent. In short, these thinkers, while deconstructing the whole, still gesture toward it. They do not discard "everything"; they merely approach it from different sides. So, to summarize: everything is not merely an abstract or poetic idea. It is the ground from which value itself arises. To understand importance, or even unimportance, we must measure it against the concept of everything. And thus, our very being is profoundly tied to everything—not just to things in the world, but to everything as such. What I am beginning to articulate is not just a vague totality, but a philosophical concept of everything-itself. Yet even as I say this, the modern age presents a strange tension: we celebrate the unimportant, the marginal, the overlooked. This does not negate everything—it complicates our relation to it. Therefore, we must move beyond the simple binary of important versus unimportant. We must think through a concept that includes both—the veil and what lies behind it. And in doing so, we are once again called to everything, and perhaps we rediscover its importance, in a deeper, subtler sense. This is the beginning of allness as a concept—not a doctrine, but a horizon. However, the concepts of wholeness and allness must not be taken for granted. They require careful clarification, and such clarification must arise from within the concepts themselves—not by comparing them to their opposites or defining them merely as the sum of parts. They should be discerned by why they are as they are, not by what they are not. This inward reflection demands that we once again turn to the very question of everything. Thus arises a paradoxical question: "What is all?" But this question quickly transforms into a more difficult one: "What is not all, among all?" In other words, in seeking to understand what everything is, we are inevitably led to confront the question of what escapes everything, what resists inclusion in the totality. This logical twist can be deeply unsettling, even frustrating, because it reveals a limit built into the very concept of limitlessness. Yet this frustration should not mislead us into thinking that the concept of allness is simply something internal, something residing solely in our minds or perceptions. As Martin Heidegger pointed out in his analysis of the concept of Being, such fundamental notions are not simply subjective projections. Rather, they transcend our individual being—they stand outside us, shaping the very horizon of our understanding. In the same way, the concept of "everything," or allness, also carries an implicit transcendence. It reaches beyond what we can say or contain. It gestures toward something greater than any single act of thinking. It includes itself, but also exceeds itself. This is where the difficulty lies. If the concept of allness is already beyond us—and even beyond itself—then it may not be fully expressible within our standard modes of reasoning. It may not be entirely conceptualizable at all. That may explain why the great philosophers of the past rarely, if ever, tackled the issue of allness itself directly. Certainly, historical and intellectual contexts shaped what questions were asked, and which were considered possible or meaningful. But there is another possibility: perhaps we have misunderstood the ancients. Perhaps we have unfairly dismissed their cosmologies and ontologies as primitive, because we lacked a refined concept of everything as itself. Our own intellectual blind spot—our failure to see allness—may have caused us to misread theirs. For this reason, it is worth noting that our ancestors often spoke not of "allness," but only of their own 'alls.' That is, they asserted particular totalities from within particular perspectives. They did not confront the radical, reflexive question of everything as such. For example, when Thales proclaimed that "everything is water," this was a pioneering moment in the history of thought—a bold attempt to define what underlies all things. And yet, it fell short. Why? Because it did not address the question of what is not water. It reduced allness to a particular substance, and in doing so, neglected the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion.

Likewise, Heraclitus, in saying “everything is change,” captured a deep truth about reality’s flux. But in doing so, he lost sight of stability. By collapsing all into one principle, philosophers often fail to see what gets left out—what refuses to be collapsed. This is precisely why the apophatic tradition, or negative theology, becomes relevant here. It reminds us that the most profound truths may not be definable at all, and that sometimes, what cannot be said is as meaningful as what can. Even in the modern period, this tendency persists. Wittgenstein, for instance, famously argued that many philosophical problems arise from the misuse of language, and sought to dissolve them by analyzing language-games. But in focusing so intensely on the linguistic frame, he may have lost sight of what transcends language—what might be called the super-linguistic or the spiritual. Ironically, despite the fact that his life was deeply spiritual, his theory did not allow for a clear articulation of that very dimension. Again, his framework captured a particular all, but not allness itself. The problem is not merely that these thinkers missed something. Rather, their systems were distorted wholes—they constructed partial “alls” and mistook them for totalities. And because their “alls” were incomplete, they also misunderstood the elements within them. To interpret these thinkers rightly, we must first uncover the true meaning of allness, the horizon in which their ideas arise. Moreover, this issue is not confined to philosophy. It touches all domains of inquiry. In fact, many disciplines become philosophical precisely when they attempt to solve their problems strictly within their own boundaries—without recognizing their dependence on larger frameworks. Take biology as an example. It studies life, organisms, and evolution. One could argue that all experimental tools, all scientific practices, are ultimately grounded in human biology. Evolutionary theory can explain not only the forms of life but even the development of tools, language, and scientific reasoning itself. In this view, biology becomes a kind of meta-discipline, one that treats the observer and the observed, the method and the object, within its own evolutionary frame. Even philosophy, from this perspective, might be seen as a function of neurobiology or cognitive evolution. Physical elements such as atoms and forces might be interpreted through the lens of biological selection: the kinds of realities we can observe are those our evolved brains are capable of perceiving. But this reduction—however powerful—also risks becoming just another ‘all’. It treats everything from within a single perspective and thus becomes blind to what that perspective excludes. It fails to recognize the meta-question: how do we justify one particular “all” against the horizon of allness itself? This brings us full circle. Whether in philosophy or science, theology or art, the question remains: What is everything—not from the inside of a particular system, but as itself? Only by confronting this question directly can we begin to reorient the fragments of knowledge, re-express the meaning of being, and perhaps restore something we have long forgotten: the silent, encompassing presence of everything itself. There exists a notion—barely touched upon by the dominant traditions of thought—that demands a reckoning beyond the well-worn categories of metaphysics, epistemology, or theology. It is not merely being, nor is it reducible to truth, nor is it adequately contained within the nomenclature of God. Rather, it hovers above these domains, permeating them without being identical to any of them. For the purposes of tentative nomenclature, we might speak of this as the Every, or perhaps Every-Being, or Total-Truth, or even the Absolute. Yet these appellations only scratch the surface; they merely gesture toward a concept that remains fundamentally ineffable and elusive. One may be tempted to ask: is this an ontological concern, regarding the nature of what is? Or is it epistemological, a matter of how we know what is? Or perhaps theological, gesturing toward divinity? But such questions presuppose the very dichotomies that this notion seeks to dissolve. Indeed, the Every transcends and invalidates the bifurcations that have governed philosophical discourse since antiquity. It is not a synthesis of

opposites, nor a *tertium quid*, but rather a rupture—a paradigm-exploding force that reveals the limitations of our conceptual apparatus. Being, in the traditional philosophical sense, has long suffered from reduction. It has been misperceived as that which can be grasped, classified, systematized. But in doing so, we have ignored the dimensions of Being that resist articulation—those that are irreducible to presence, identity, or even becoming. Truth, conversely, has been disembodied: idealized, abstracted, and ultimately detached from the very Being it presumes to reflect. Even the concept of God, whether approached via classical theism, negative theology, or mystical union, is constrained by the frameworks through which it is mediated. The Every, by contrast, eludes all such totalizing constructs. It is not within these categories, but prior to them—or perhaps, beneath them, like a substratum that defies visibility. Nevertheless, from these compromised concepts—Being, Truth, God—certain adjectives can be extracted, certain resonances that point toward the ineffable. These qualities—totality, inevitability, self-containment, irreducibility, universality—are like glimmers of a deeper coherence, scattered across the discourses of philosophy, theology, and mysticism. But no one has thus far dared to assemble these fragments into a unified reflection. No one has dared to ask: What is the Every, as itself? Not merely everything collectively, but the very condition of all things, the singular plurality that is neither one nor many. In this sense, the present inquiry is, in its very essence, transcendental, illogical, and formally inconsistent. It breaks the laws of classical reasoning not by error, but by design. Its ambition is not to conform to the established disciplines, but to birth a new mode of thought that renders this ineffable concept at least approachable, if never fully apprehensible. The task, then, is paradoxical: to render the unstudyable study-able, to construct a discourse around the indescribable, to think the unthinkable without annihilating its alterity. And our era, perhaps more than any prior, is in dire need of such thinking. In a time when all systems seem exhausted, when epistemologies collapse into relativism and metaphysics into nihilism, the call of the Every resounds. It demands a reevaluation not of values alone, but of the very architectures of thought. This is not a return to first principles, but a leap toward what precedes principle altogether. It is the inauguration of a new intellectual epoch—one that begins, humbly and precariously, with the discernment of the Every. This present approach, albeit tentative and fragmentary, bears a structural resemblance to Heidegger's ontological revolution. As is well known, Heidegger famously castigated the entire tradition of Western metaphysics as being mired in the oblivion of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). According to him, the philosophical canon—from Plato to Nietzsche—failed to foreground Being itself (*Sein*), obsessively engaging instead with entities (*Seiendes*) and reifying metaphysical constructs without interrogating their ontological ground. In rectifying this, Heidegger reoriented philosophy around the temporality of Being, culminating in his analytic of *Dasein*—the being who understands Being. *Dasein*, uniquely among beings, possesses the existential-ontological structure through which the question of Being can be meaningfully posed. This was indeed a seismic reconfiguration of thought, compelling us to rethink existence, time, and finitude. Yet, for all its profundity, Heidegger's analysis remains anthropocentric, anchored in human finitude and the situatedness of *Dasein*. Our present inquiry dares to go further. We are not merely concerned with Being-for-humans, but with the Every—a concept that may exceed the anthropological confines of *Dasein* altogether. Where Heidegger provincialized metaphysics in favor of temporality and existential disclosure, our task is to provincialize even ontology itself, on behalf of that which underlies and exceeds it: Everyness—that which is not merely inclusive of all beings, but which bears the mark of totality as itself. To clarify this rupture, consider the case of Galileo Galilei. His intellectual greatness lay not solely in the empirical acuity of his discoveries, but in his epistemic

insurrection. Galileo decoupled science from the authority of metaphysics and theological fiat. He re-situated celestial mechanics not within the domain of divinely ordained harmony, but within an autonomous, testable physical framework. The laws of planetary motion no longer presupposed angelic spheres or Aristotelian essences; they became phenomena explicable through self-contained principles of physical causality. Galileo's audacity lay in scientific self-referentiality—that science could become accountable to itself alone. This inaugurated the autonomization of disciplines and birthed the modern scientific method. And yet, in a stunning paradox, no such autonomy has ever been afforded to the concept of the All. While Being, truth, nature, and even God have been interrogated, dissected, and occasionally vindicated by reason or revelation, Everyness—that most encompassing of concepts—remains epistemically orphaned. Worse still, the All has not merely been neglected; it has been constrained, minimized, and subordinated—often reduced to a background assumption in other discourses. It has functioned merely as a container rather than as a subject of inquiry in its own right. Therefore, the first imperative of this study is to liberate the All from its derivative status and to position it as the matter of itself—to allow it to appear not as context but as content, not as passive backdrop but as active problematic. However, any attempt to grasp the All through traditional disciplinary modalities will falter, precisely because such modalities are intrinsically particularizing. The moment one says “some,” one disqualifies oneself from speaking of “every.” The gesture of categorization, necessary in science, ontology, or even theology, betrays the very universality we are seeking. Even the greatest epistemic skeptics—Pyrrho, Descartes—who doubted all they could possibly doubt, failed to interrogate the All qua All. Their investigations were hamstrung by the limitations of their methodologies, which presupposed a bounded arena of doubt or cognitive finitude. How, then, are we to approach that which is all-encompassing? To this end, I propose an allegorical method. As Nietzsche clothed his insights in myth, aphorism, and metaphor—knowing that some truths are too volatile for direct exposition—so too must our investigation adopt a mythopoetic logic, one capable of transcending the arid constraints of linear deduction. As postmodern theorists have shown, sometimes thought must transgress its own boundaries in order to reveal the aporetic limit of thought itself. And yet, unlike certain strands of postmodernism that delight in pure transgression, our project cannot afford to abandon logic altogether. This is not a discourse on transcendence alone, but on Everyness—a notion which paradoxically includes logic within itself. Therefore, our inquiry must exhibit a double fidelity: it must honor the structures of reason, while also subverting them from within; it must maintain the semblance of coherence, even as it strains toward the unrepresentable. From this, a second essential characteristic of our study emerges: it must be holistic, embracing the full spectrum of existence—light and dark, joy and despair, the angelic and the demonic. We are not here to idealize or sanitize; we are here to incorporate. Just as the All does not exclude contradiction, our text cannot exclude failure. If we falter in our pursuit, that faltering itself becomes part of the archive. If we cannot justify, our very attempt to justify—our sweat, our struggle—becomes the justification. This is the ethical magnetism of all authentic study: not success, but earnestness in the face of the intractable. Thus, I find myself at the threshold of an unprecedented undertaking. What is required is nothing less than the invention of a new genre—a genre untethered from conventional categories of discourse. It will not be pure philosophy, nor speculative theology, nor symbolic literature. It will be all of them, and more. It will carry us not toward a conclusion, but toward a prolonged encounter with the All. And in that encounter, we may at last begin—not to understand, but to discern the Every. I propose to demarcate the concept of everyness—that is, the totality as itself, irreducible and unfragmented—according to a symbolic schema derived

from a mythopoetic referent: the Lernaean Hydra of Hellenic mythology. This chimeric entity, infinitely regenerative and ceaselessly proliferative, serves not merely as a mythical grotesque but as an allegorical cipher for the impossibility of ontological finality and the recursive nature of all-encompassing being. The Hydra, in its ever-multiplying heads, constitutes an apt heuristic metaphor for the problem of totality in philosophical discourse. Each decapitated head, by birthing two more in its absence, enacts a relentless dialectic of negation and affirmation—a cycle wherein every ontic exclusion recursively reintroduces multiplicity. This echoes, almost uncannily, the epistemological vertigo encountered in the domain of radical skepticism. The skeptic attempts to affirm a propositional truth, only to be haunted by the counter-propositional specter: what if it is false? But negating even this doubt breeds a bifurcation—what if it is true? and what if that truth is merely another concealment of error? Thus, in place of resolution, one is engulfed by an interminable bifurcation of epistemic anxiety. Yet the Hydra, while monstrous, is not simply a monster. It must be understood through the dual register of its allegorical and ontological dimensions. Its multiplicity—the freedom and semi-autonomy of its proliferating heads—gestures toward an image of a chaotic totality, unmastered and non-hierarchical. However, this superficial chaos veils an originary unity: all heads, however errant, are rooted in one corporeal substratum. Herein lies the paradox that haunts the very notion of everything: an inconsistent multiplicity that nevertheless presupposes an immanent consistency. It is this paradoxical consistency-in-inconsistency that renders the Hydra an emblem of metaphysical significance. Such a figure resists easy assimilation into the classical dialectics of identity and difference. Even Derrida's *différance*, which endeavors to account for the interminable deferral of meaning and the simultaneity of sameness and alterity, ultimately remains within the parameters of oppositional semiotics: same/other, speech/writing, presence/absence, divine/spectral. The apparatus of *différance*, while disruptive, is still haunted by the metaphysics it aims to displace. Its invocation of the trace, the specter, or the grammatological residue remains tethered to epistemic structures of containment—semantic, theological, or ontological. But the Hydra, as I envision it, is not merely a symptom of *différance* but its transgression. It does not defer or differ from anything; it defies. It is not the interplay of absence and presence—it is the abyss in which presence and absence implode into indiscernibility. The Hydra is thus not only an allegory of totality but an an-iconic icon of what I term the All beyond all someness. Its sole adversary is someness, the arbitrary delimitation of being into partiality, identity, and discrete particularity. It emerges not from the plurality of being, but from a fundamental antipathy to singularization. The Lernaean lake from which this creature was born is not merely a mythic locale—it is a symbol of epistemic obscurity, a locus of origin that resists total exposure, reflecting only the Hydra back to itself in an infinite recursion. In this sense, the Hydra is a mirror that cannot reflect anything outside itself. It is auto-referential, yes, but not in the solipsistic sense—it is panreferential, encompassing all within its self-reflection without collapsing into narcissism. Therefore, I submit that this beast—this ontological specter, this symbolic insurgent against all systems of delimitation—is a fitting emblem for the new philosophy of the All. It is not the totality that includes everything within a closed set, but the totality that is radically open, infinite not by extension but by intensional refusal of closure. It is not just another signifier among many, but the very eruption of the signifying chain itself. Let the Hydra, then, stand as the heraldic image of our yet-to-be-conceived metaphysics: a totality that consumes the very idea of totality, a concept that renders every other concept contingent, and a being that reveals that all beings are forever already part of the All—not by inclusion, but by their very impossibility of exclusion.

Hydrophobia: The Advent of the Hydraic Revolution

A Lernaeanist Manifesto

A new age dawns—an age not of man’s mastery over chaos, but of chaos reclaiming its rightful dignity. This is the era of the Hydraic Revolution, and this text is its Lernaeanist Manifesto. In this manifesto, I raise from the abyss a symbol long buried in fear and shame—a being of horror in ancient myth, now to be honored in philosophical truth: the Hydra. Hydra, that monstrous being born from the swamps of Lerna, has been misunderstood for too long. Its many heads, infinitely regenerative, were not merely a biological anomaly but an ontological allegory. A metaphor for the irreducible multiplicity of Being, the inescapable plurality of truth, the eternal rebirth of meaning. Yet the Hydra was hated. Like the abstract and elusive concept of the All—itsself neglected, distorted, or conveniently ignored by systems of thought too linear to accommodate infinity—Hydra was cast into the role of the abominable. Heracles, the paragon of heroic reason and rational conquest, was sent to slay it. He represents that archetypal will of Man to reduce the universe to manageable parts, to dominate Being through order, hierarchy, and force. We remember what transpired. Heracles severed head after head—but for each one he destroyed, two more emerged. Fire was summoned by his companion Iolaus to cauterize the wounds, to prevent rebirth. But even that seemed temporary, futile. Finally, Heracles resorted not to victory, but to avoidance. He pressed down the immortal central head beneath a massive boulder, imprisoning it rather than overcoming it. This was not triumph, but philosophical evasion. Heracles, the icon of intellectual domination, failed. Not because he lacked power, but because he lacked vision. He faced not a beast, but the embodiment of a truth that cannot be slain: that every act of intellectual violence births its own consequences, that knowledge endlessly exceeds the frame of human control. The Hydra was not defeated—it was buried, silenced beneath the weight of the unexamined. We have seen this pattern in our intellectual history. Think of Pyrrho of Elis, who upon encountering the infinite regress of doubt, chose to retreat into epoché—a suspension of judgment—and sought peace in ataraxia, a quietude born not from certainty, but from surrender. But this too was a kind of burial—a cautious turning away from the Hydra, not a meeting of its gaze. This is the hydrophobia of the human mind. It is the fear not of the unknown, but of the unknowable. The fear that beneath every question lies another. That behind every answer sprouts two more. That there may be no final head to sever—no closure, no master key, no ultimate principle that explains everything. And so, in response, civilization has repeatedly chosen the boulder. We build systems that negate anomalies, ethics that suppress ambiguity, sciences that ignore subjectivity, religions that fear paradox. In doing so, we sentence ourselves to suppression. Suppression of the Hydra within—the ever-regenerating life of thought, the chaos that births creativity, the plurality that defines truth. But here is the turning point. What if the Hydra is not a threat, but a teacher? What if the boulder is not an instrument of repression, but a fellow sufferer of repression itself? What if we have misunderstood the entire scene? Let us imagine: time has passed. The boulder, having pressed down the Hydra for centuries, has learned its gravity anew. And the Hydra, though crushed, has never ceased to grow—quietly, steadily, patiently. It has become stronger than the stone, fiercer than the flame, more enduring than the hero. Now, something unprecedented occurs. The Hydra does not merely endure the boulder—it becomes it. Its mass becomes matter; its flesh, fire; its multiplicity, a new form of singularity—not through reduction, but through allness. It does not

dissolve contradiction but contains it. It is no longer the hunted beast. It is philosophy reborn. And so, the boulder and the Hydra speak.

The Hydra's Awakening

Then it's time to reawaken! But
How is it about
The Boulder, my dear friend?

So far We have enjoyed
Much of time together near Eternal.

You have pressed
Me with your great mass. But
I know how you were so much pressed
Since by your gravity and
I know how you were so much afraid
By the Great Heracles.

It's time to
Reawaken! It's time to
Revenge! I know we are
All the victims of Heracles, my Friends: the Fire,
The Boulder and the World!

It's time to come. Come
Whoever you are! Let's
Make The beast party
Of revenges Tonight!

Toward a Hydraic Philosophy

This is not merely allegory. This is the foundation of a new metaphysical possibility: a philosophy that no longer seeks to kill the Hydra, nor to hide it, but to become it. A philosophy that embraces the multiplicity of being, the recursion of thought, the unending birth of the many from the one. We are no longer in the age of Heracles. We are in the age of Hydra. And now begins the Hydraic Revolution. Let all who have feared, all who have been silenced, all who have been fragmented—come forth. Let the heads rise not to dominate, but to see, to speak, to think. Hydra does not wish to rule, but to be. The era of suppression is over. Let us unbury the All. Let us release the Hydra within. As we have approached the notion of the All — the totality, the comprehensive truth — we now return to the realm of our daily existence. Yet, paradoxically, this return is not accompanied by tranquility or resolution. Instead of a serene satisfaction, what we encounter is an unexpected and disquieting void. It is as if, having glimpsed the summit of thought, we find that its air is thin, its view strangely hollow. The long-sought “all” is now in our

possession — or so it seems — yet it offers no warmth, no nourishment for the soul. It is as though we opened a long-locked door only to discover a still, airless chamber. There arises within us a strange and inexpressible dissatisfaction — a sigh of the spirit. We are reminded of Aeneas' haunting words: "He sought light in the high sky, and sighed when he found it." What is this melancholy that follows the revelation? Why, even when we have attained the totality, does it feel as if something vital is missing? It is a deeply human phenomenon. We, the seekers of meaning, find ourselves disillusioned not by ignorance, but by the very act of knowing. We have not merely recognized the All — we have, in a sense, integrated it into our thinking. We have named it, conceptualized it, and even constructed myth and structure around it. But in so doing, something essential has slipped through our fingers. Why does this unease persist? It may be that the core of our being is not suited to finality. Human nature recoils from closure, from perfect answers. We are not beings fashioned to accept completion; rather, we are creatures formed in opposition, born out of questioning. The human being is not a vessel for answers, but a wound that generates inquiry. Recall the ancient philosopher Pyrrho, who was said to have glimpsed the All and responded not with triumph but with doubt. His radical skepticism — often interpreted as a form of intellectual humility — is in truth a symptom of deeper despair. Likewise, Descartes' famous invocation of the deceiving demon reflects not a methodological clarity, but a metaphysical restlessness. His doubt is not hopeful; it is haunted. And though modern philosophy has often celebrated doubt as a tool of liberation, at its core it remains a testimony to our inability to accept what is given. This despair does not emerge merely because we lack power to act upon what we see. It is not just that we perceive possibilities but are impotent before them. It is deeper: we are structurally incapable of dwelling within the truth without resisting it. We are, by our nature, beings of rupture. Here emerges the figure of the Hydra, the mythic beast — our symbol of the All. But this beast, unlike abstract metaphysical systems, contains within itself its own subversion. It is not a tidy totality. It is a being whose very nature is to rebel against unity. It has heads that multiply when severed — an image of truth that refuses to remain singular, that regenerates its contradictions. Thus, the All — the Beast — is not a static monolith. It is alive, writhing, antagonistic to our desire for simplicity. It includes within itself its own outside, its own defiance. And this is what makes it true. Not because it comforts us, but because it mirrors us. Humans, at our core, are beings of revolt. Love acquires its meaning in the shadow of betrayal. Knowledge becomes valuable through the sting of failure. Creation arises not from satisfaction, but from lack. This contradiction is not an error; it is the very engine of our existence. The Hydra — the All — is not merely the culmination of thought. It is the very resistance to thought's complacency. It is the sign that our journey is not to arrive at answers, but to be perpetually transformed by the effort of questioning. And like the tragic Faust, who remained forever thirsty despite his pact, we too remain unquenched. The more we know, the more we crave. The closer we come, the more distant the center feels. It is not because the center does not exist, but because we were never meant to rest in it. Our desire is endless not by flaw, but by design.

We need the truth

The contradictory nature of our current understanding does not arise incidentally—it emerges precisely because we are grappling with the notion of the All. Paradoxically, the source of our dissatisfaction lies not in the lack of the All, but in a deep, unresolved yearning for the Part. This dissatisfaction, at first glance, may appear to stem from a neglect or forgetting of the All. One might claim: if we were truly and fully engaged with the true All, such dissatisfaction would

dissolve, as if an all-encompassing totality could resolve all questions in its wholeness. But this is a mistaken hope. The dissatisfaction goes far deeper. It is not a byproduct of partial understanding, but an existential consequence of engaging directly with the All itself. The very structure of totality excludes the Part—not by elimination, but by conceptual difference. When we attempt to grasp everything as everything, the particular vanishes as a distinct element. It is as though an oracle could reflect all the forms in the world—trees, faces, stars, monuments—but never its own face. The All reflects all things, but cannot mirror itself as a part. This tension brings us face-to-face with the question of oneness. We have attempted to engage the All, and have spoken of everyness, but in doing so, we have failed to truly recognize the identity of what we are within it. The paradox is ontological and epistemological: we have touched the infinite, but lost the local; we have touched the universal, but lost the personal. Thus arises a contradiction that is not accidental, but structural—a conflict between consistency and inconsistency, between unity and fragmentation. What, then, is to be done? The task before us is not merely to declare the All, but to restore the preciousness of the Part. The particular, the singular, the finite—these are not fragments to be absorbed into a greater whole, but realities that cry out for recognition. Identity itself is often forged not by inclusion, but by distinction. The One emerges through a negation of the other. And herein lies the fundamental dilemma of philosophy and civilization alike: we long for universality, but we live in particularity. In ontology, philosophers have ascribed a privileged essence to existence itself—Being—as if to say: this is what is real. In epistemology, they have located a strange transcendence within knowledge—Truth—claiming: this is what is knowable. In both cases, a bifurcation occurs: the world is divided into two domains—one that is real or true, and another that is derivative, illusory, or false. But this division, while appearing to affirm something singular, actually masks a deeper desire: not to divide, but to comprehend the All. Ironically, the classical effort to assign being or truth was itself an attempt to totalize, to name all that matters. My own approach, however, is the reverse. I do not aim to stretch the part into the universal. Rather, I return from the All to rediscover the One—not the universal One, but the one who speaks, who feels, who questions. For even in the totality, we remain unsettled. We are not content to be absorbed. We need to know what we are, to name ourselves. Without this, we are like nameless grains of sand, drifting in a boundless desert—formless, disoriented, forgotten. Yet we are not without signs. In myth, the Hydra continues to rise. It is slain, and returns. The part, the singular, asserts itself again and again. We may speak of the All, but the Part returns with multiplicity and defiance. And thus we see: this is not merely a conceptual problem. This is a problem of power. To deal with totality—to resist being erased within it—we require a force not of mere thought, but of existential and revolutionary strength. We need a new kind of power. A radical and urgent force that is capable of overturning not just old truths, but the world itself—the world that contains our story, our identities, our contradictions. We need the power that restores the One without dissolving the Many. We need the truth, not as an abstract ideal, but as something we can inhabit and name. We need the Hydra and the Oracle, the Desert and the Name. We need the Part. We need the One. We need the All—transfigured. How, then, might we truly reconstruct and harmonize the profound relationships between consistency and inconsistency, the Part and the All, the One and the Everyness? This question strikes at the very core of the philosophical and civilizational journey of humankind. Across history, thinkers and societies alike have struggled to balance the individual and the collective, the finite and the infinite, the rational and the intuitive. Indeed, many of the most enduring intellectual conflicts—such as the tension between reason and sense, logic and emotion—ultimately stem from this deeper metaphysical divide. To

address the question of the All—of totality, of Being—we must not isolate it from the questions of the self or the One. Every attempt to define or embrace the All necessarily brings forth the issue of particularity, of individuality. The self asserts itself in contrast to the All, and the All cannot be meaningfully discussed without invoking the One. Thus, we cannot claim to have resolved the question of the All unless we have also grappled with its internal duality and the paradox it generates. The path forward lies not in privileging one over the other, but in seeking a true harmony between opposites. We must find a method through which the One and the All, the consistent and the inconsistent, may not only coexist but mutually affirm and elevate each other. This is no simple fusion nor a forced synthesis, for history has shown us that attempts to unify all things into a single, overarching system often result in alienation, reductionism, or suppression. Still, we cannot abandon the effort by clinging to either pole—neither the atomized self nor the totalizing collective. The two are inherently contrary in nature, and yet it is precisely through their tension that higher forms of understanding may emerge. Paradoxically, resolution may not lie in clarity, but in embracing contradiction—a riddle rather than a reason. We enter through one door, and find ourselves exiting through another. Thus, different entities, even when seemingly irreconcilable, are revealed to be interconnected. Some may call this phenomenon a paradox—truth becoming falsehood, and vice versa. Others may see it as illusion, a trick of the mind or language. But in the tradition of philosophy, it has often been called wisdom. History offers us many such examples. Socrates, the archetype of the philosopher, professed ignorance even as he guided others to insight. The Buddha proclaimed emptiness—not as nihilism, but as a transcendence of both self and suffering. These sages appear to deny themselves, yet in doing so, they affirm a deeper truth. Their humility is not self-effacement, but an act of transformation: by negating themselves, they redirect us toward something greater. And so, we find ourselves caught in a kind of philosophical circle. To reject the teachings of the wise is to be driven—eventually, perhaps even inevitably—back toward their wisdom. To submit fully to their doctrines is to reach the point where we must move beyond them. In this dialectical movement—denial and return, obedience and transcendence—we may glimpse the deeper meaning of Nirvana: not the escape from contradiction, but the resolution of contradiction within itself. Then once again, we encounter a kind of wisdom that emerges not from formal doctrines or academic philosophy, but from the rich symbolic landscape of mythology. Let us consider, in particular, the often-overlooked role of Iolaus, the nephew and companion of Heracles, in the legendary battle against the Lernaean Hydra. Though Heracles occupies the central place in this myth, it is Iolaus who introduces a decisive solution. Despite being largely neglected by mythologists and philosophers alike throughout history, Iolaus plays a pivotal role—so much so that we might argue that the ultimate victory over the Hydra was, in substance if not in glory, achieved by him. Why? Because brute strength proved useless against a creature that regenerated two heads for every one severed. The challenge here was not one of force, but of intelligence, timing, and insight into the nature of the beast. It was Iolaus who proposed the radical idea of cauterizing the necks as soon as Heracles severed the heads, preventing regeneration. His method, while aggressive, was categorically distinct from Heracles' approach. Heracles attacked; Iolaus understood. His use of fire was not merely destructive—it was adaptive. It utilized the Hydra's own regenerative mechanism against itself. The more the Hydra attempted to multiply, the more it exposed its vulnerability. The fire, paradoxically, both destroyed and preserved. This offers a profound allegory: sometimes, the solution to a repeating crisis is not to overpower it, but to comprehend and redirect its own logic inward. In this tale, we see not only a mythological victory, but a philosophical metaphor: Iolaus embodies an attempt to harmonize the great binary

tension of history—creation and destruction, self and other, life and death. In Heracles we see the archetype of heroic assertion: the desire to conquer, to dominate, to impose singular will. But in Iolaus, we glimpse a different kind of hero—one who does not deny the mechanism of the Other, but seeks to understand it, and in doing so, redirects its force toward resolution. He respects the Hydra’s nature, and this respect becomes the very ground of victory. Fire, too, plays a central role in this story. Fire consumes—and yet, in consuming, it sustains itself. It destroys its fuel, but only so that it may continue to burn. It is, in this sense, a symbol of both transience and persistence, both death and endurance. This dual nature is what Iolaus harnesses, and it is this same dual nature that underlies all paradox. In this light, we might even reinterpret the myth: what if the Hydra, under the pressure of repeated cauterizations, became fire itself? No longer a creature of the swamp, it transformed—its regenerative instinct sublimated into flame. In this interpretation, the Hydra becomes not just a vanquished foe, but a symbolic deity of fire—born through conflict, elevated through paradox. Thus, what began as a battle between Heracles and Hydra is ultimately revealed to be a dance between Hydra and flame. From opposition arises union; from struggle emerges synthesis. This allegory leads us to a deeper philosophical point. Heraclitus, the great philosopher of becoming and change, once declared: “All is fire.” In the Hydra’s transformation, we see this aphorism come to life. The truth here is not static, not located in one side or the other—not in the All alone, nor in the Part alone—but in the dynamic interpenetration of opposites. Let us call this hard-won harmony Truth—not in the conventional sense of fixed propositions or dogmas, but in the deeper, paradoxical, and evolving sense. This kind of “Iolian Truth” does not reject the dichotomy between truth and falsehood, being and nothingness, the One and the All. Rather, it affirms their coexistence and mutual necessity. In ontological terms, it points to a space where Being and Non-Being intertwine, echoing both Eastern metaphysics and post-Heraclitean thought. To describe this more precisely, let us introduce a new term: “Iolian Everyness.” This name signifies a conceptual framework distinct from the purely Heracleian (which emphasizes change and flux) or Lernaean (which suggests chaos and monstrous reproduction). Iolian Everyness embraces both the unity of the One and the multiplicity of the Part. It is not a synthesis that erases difference, but a cohabitation of contradictions—a state in which paradox is not resolved, but lived. In affirming this, I propose a renewed metaphysical vision—the All as Iolian—a form of Everyness that neither rejects contradiction nor surrenders to it, but inhabits it with understanding. And in this inhabitation, we may find a new mode of wisdom: not the triumph of the hero, but the insight of the one who assists. Then here remains my final argument. What must be done now, after all that has been said? Our ambition from the outset has been to sketch the contours of a new intellectual discipline—one that we may provisionally name Everyness. Through this inquiry, we have obtained a measure of discernment, and that alone is no trivial gain. Our intellectual history, as we now perceive it, has often adopted a mode we might term Heracleian totality—a form of striving that seeks to grasp the whole by brute force, by interpretive conquest. As we discussed in the initial phase of our reflection, every attempt to capture “the All” has failed—not due to a lack of rigor or passion, but because it has always tried to interpret the Whole in terms of a part, in terms of some aspect, framework, or limited modality. Thus, any statement like “the world is such and such” becomes not a revelation of the All, but rather a personal interpretation of it. The All, in its very nature, eludes such framing. Even the term “world” suggests a kind of externality—as though the All were a bounded object “out there” to be grasped or known. But the All cannot be treated in this manner. It defies objectification, quantification, and even naming. And yet, when the Everyness resists the philosopher’s interpretation, the philosopher—

like Heracles—throws a great boulder upon it, hoping to silence it, to fix it in place. But this Hydra-like totality—this Lernaean Everyness—cannot be subdued permanently. Each time it is struck down, it regenerates. The more pressure applied, the more forcefully it reemerges. For there is a truth here: power cannot overcome procreation; domination cannot destroy becoming. And thus, we begin to recognize something essential: the genuine entity we seek, the thing we have tried to name, to reduce, to grasp, is not passive—it is active, regenerative, protean. It is Everyness itself. Like the moment in the history of science when humanity discovered that what it took for centuries as metaphysical truth was, in fact, a material phenomenon—or vice versa—our realization now is not about discovering a new fact, but unveiling a deep misunderstanding that has governed our entire approach to totality. This new discernment is crucial. It is not merely an intellectual insight, but a paradigmatic shift. Yet we must not discard the past—the Heracleian impulse—so lightly. Though its approach was flawed, its motive—its striving toward the All—remains significant. The attempt to reduce the Whole to the Part was misguided, yes, but it was not in vain. It too must be understood as a necessary part of the unfolding of Everyness. And in this recognition, we may call upon Heracles again—not to conquer, but to choose. For choice remains a sacred act in human existence. To choose is not merely to act, but to affirm. And this affirmation has ontological significance. Thus, we do not abandon the Heracleian; we transfigure it. Hence, let us seek to harmonize these opposing poles. We now move toward what I will call the Iolian totality—a vision that affirms the paradoxical unity of all things, the recognition that “one can be all”, and names this unity “Truth.” This truth is not a doctrine, but a window—a transparent threshold between the inner and the outer. To truly grasp this requires a profound inversion: to notice that, under strange phenomena, the outer world flows backward into the inner. This is not a metaphor but a metaphysical proposition: the self only lives through the Other, and the Other only emerges through the self. They are interdependent and distinct, united and estranged. At this point, we must embrace a certain hallucination, a philosophical one. One might say it deviates from reality, but it offers a unique solution between the All and the Part. It is a paradox: we gain truth by way of falsehood, and falsehood by the pursuit of truth. We arrive at consistency by acknowledging contradiction. The irreconcilable—water and oil—may, under peculiar conditions, become soluble in each other. This paradox is not a flaw; it is the very form of genuine Truth. Let us call this the Iolian Truth. But if we now understand that the Heracleian can become the Iolian, and the Iolian contains the Heracleian, we must return and reevaluate the Heracleian project—that vast body of traditional knowledge which we once dismissed as limited or misguided. Think of Plato, who declared that the Idea cannot be fully grasped in writing. Yet he wrote. Think of Hegel, who sought the Absolute Spirit and yet was tormented by dialectical negation. Think of the postmodernists, who tried to overcome the limits of language while using language. Their contradictions are not failures—they are signposts. Their failures are their confessions. And in these confessions, we find what they truly wished to express: the inexpressibility of the Whole. The same applies to science. Darwin, for instance, cannot transcend the evolutionary-genetic frame. If he is entirely correct, he is bound within it. Yet precisely when Darwinism evolves beyond itself, it becomes intelligible in a new light. These seemingly non-philosophical disciplines become vividly philosophical the moment they confront their limits—when they accept that Truth may require both consistency and inconsistency. Thus, when a scholar insists on his particular viewpoint, we must not deride him for narrowness. He does not merely fixate on his point of view—he is, perhaps unwittingly, gesturing toward the larger landscape behind it. This is especially visible in art, where ambiguity says more than any explicit claim. The painter, the poet, the performer—they do not speak plainly, yet they say

everything. Even outside disciplinary boundaries, this pattern appears. In the streets, during social demonstrations, we may perceive a kind of ritual—an embodied truth, a performance that points beyond itself. Here, we are reminded of the alchemical wisdom of Cleopatra the Alchemist, who declared: “The All is the One.” Or of the ancient symbol of the Ouroboros, the serpent devouring its tail—a cycle of becoming, disappearance, and return. The Hydra dies and regenerates precisely because it devours itself. This is the nature of great ambition—to grasp the world from the seed of its origin, to contain the cosmos within a single drop of water. And so, we return to that haunting line from Ulysses:

But perhaps we are not to awaken from the nightmare, but through it. For the dream, too, is part of the Everyness.

The Iolian Truth and the Everyness as Contradiction

At last, we arrive at the paradoxical heart of our inquiry: that this notion we have pursued—*Iolian Truth* and *Everyness*—is by its very essence inconsistent. Not by error, not by oversight, but by design. Its nature is not to align neatly into the binary logic of affirmation or negation, but rather to include both affirmation and negation as its constitutive forces. It is not a compromise between the two, but a strange and wondrous unity in tension. In this peculiarity—in this refusal to settle into fixed identity or simple clarity—we begin to suspect that this entire theoretical journey, as earnest and intricate as it has been, is nothing more than a great story. A mythos in the deepest sense. And suddenly we remember the final lesson of Wittgenstein: that the ladder we have used to climb to such metaphysical heights must be kicked away once we have climbed over it. The structure that carried us must now be discarded. We are not to linger on the structure, but to proceed beyond it, into the ineffable. And what remains? Not doctrine. Not system. Not some final concept. What remains is this: life itself. The gentle rhythm of daily existence. The act of loving oneself and the other, not as moral instruction, but as metaphysical imperative. We are not summoned to build yet another metaphysical edifice. Rather, we are called to live—to embody the very contradictions we have come to understand. But still, there is one thing that must be remembered: This “Truth” I have spoken of is composed not of clarity alone, but of two conditions: the true and the false. These are not mutually exclusive opposites in the usual sense. To arrive at truth, one must pass through the false. One must clarify oneself by denying oneself. This is not simply about rejecting illusion—it is about seeing that illusion is already a layer of the real. However, this insight does not refer to a trivial point between truth and falsehood, as if they were merely adjacent along a linear continuum. Rather, we must learn to see them in their Ouroboric form: a recursive cycle in which each becomes the other, each depends on the other, and together they constitute a living whole. It is not that truth sometimes disguises itself as falsehood, or that falsehood can masquerade as truth—it is that their very structure is shared. They are inconsistent, yes—but only in that they are deeply consistent with the deeper logic of life. This is not deceit. It is not the pretense of an opportunistic politician. It is not propaganda, nor manipulation. It is the aesthetic contradiction, the artistic form, which says more precisely because it is ambiguous. We must learn to speak at the threshold between truth and falsehood. Not to resolve the paradox, but to dwell within it, to listen to what it reveals. And this too demands a kind of honesty: an honest cheating, if such a phrase can be allowed. A substantive falseness that, paradoxically, opens the door to a deeper kind of truth. But even in this, we are

reminded of our place: we are still poor, ordinary people—humble seekers walking amidst ruins and fire, not sages seated upon high thrones.

The Apocalypse

Threading, Threeeeeeeading!
The big flame was treading
Into downtown
To fiercely burn
Every culture! But the burning,
When closely looking,
Was but the dragon, shaped as Hydra.

With infinite heads and eyes,
They seem to search
For something. It also said
“Where is Heracles!”, “Bring him in front
Of me!”
But, ‘Heracles is no more.’
I murmured.

But the beast came to me. I
Can’t help but seeing its face
Before my final apocalypse.
There, I saw, the image of Heracles
Composed of a lot of furs
Of necks of the Dragon.